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This article examines the nature and extent of the changes in
Brazilian industry after ten years of economic liberalization.  The arti-
cle demonstrates that most structural features of Brazilian industry
remain unchanged except in the management of production
processes and in the ownership structure of firms, as rationalization
and inward internationalization became generalized processes.
Brazil may face a development paradox in the years to come.
History suggests that local capital and innovation capabilities have
been outstanding features of countries successful in achieving sus-
tained economic development. If internationalization of ownership is
to remain and local innovation capabilities are to be pursued, then
Brazil ian private and public policy makers must depart from 
established policy practices and seek new ways of regulating and
inducing firms towards local value creation.
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In 1996, we published, in CEPAL Review and in a
book with Lia Haguenauer,1 an in-depth analysis of
the competitiveness of Brazilian industry (Ferraz,
Kupfer and Haguenauer, 1996a and 1996b). The pres-
ent article2 updates that analysis by examining the
nature and extent of changes in Brazilian industry
between 1990 and 2002, a period of significant insti-
tutional and economic transformation. Economic lib-
eralization became the central feature of the national
regime of incentives and regulations and, after decades
of high inflation, price stabilization was achieved,
becoming thereafter a major target of macroeconomic
policies. But, during the same period, low rates of
growth, with frequent annual oscillations, prevailed. 
Elsewhere, in most developed and developing
countries, economic liberalization also became the
prevalent regime of incentives and regulations, while
international flows of capital, goods and services and
the diffusion of information technologies were accel-
erating. In Latin America, within the context of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
Mexico became a specialized supplier to the United
States in the assembly of electronic goods and other
labour-intensive industries. Chile modified its indus-
trial matrix, shifting towards exploiting and transform-
ing its natural resource base to generate products for
export, supported by sophisticated logistics. Argentina
changed its strategy several times; for some time it
seemed that the country would constitute an important
specialized industrial base for the Mercosur market,
but the negative consequences of the Argentine con-
vertibility plan resulted in the dismantling of a signif-
icant portion of its industrial base. 
What happened in Brazil? To what extent did
institutional reform induce changes in industry? Did
investment rates increase, incorporating new activi-
ties? Which ones ceased to exist? Are firms relying on
those capabilities – for example in the field of innova-
tion  that are widely known as conforming the basis
for sustained or expanded market shares?
It was these questions which guided us in this
article. In section II we will update the 1996 discus-
sion on patterns of competition and competitiveness.
Section III provides an account of the most important
institutional changes and an overview of the evolution
of industry between 1990 and 2002. Sections IV to VII
are focused on the analysis of competitiveness of four
industrial sectors: commodities, durable goods, tradi-
tional industries and innovation carrier industries.
Finally, section VIII gives an overall balance, indicat-
ing the common features and differences between
these sectors.
Our 1996 contribution was based on extensive
research carried out in the early 1990s (Coutinho and
Ferraz, 1994). Since then, no other comprehensive
work has been undertaken which would allow a sys-
tematic update on industrial competitiveness. The
most important research has been the “Estudo da
Competitividade de Cadeias Integradas no Brasil”
made by the Ministry of Development, Industry and
External Trade (MDIC) (www.mdic.gov.br), covering
20 industrial sectors, which constituted the informa-
tional basis for this article.
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I
Introduction
1 This article is dedicated to Lia Haguenauer. We will always miss
her companionship, professionalism and personal integrity. Our
writings will never again be so sharp and clear.
2 Sectoral information is derived from “Estudo da Competitividade
de Cadeias Integradas no Brasil” (www.mdic.gov.br), a research
project contracted by the Brazilian government to the State
University at Campinas (UNICAMP) and coordinated by Luciano
Coutinho, Mariano Laplane, David Kupfer  and Elizabeth Farina.
We are in debt with them and also with Achyles Barcelos da Costa,
Fábio Erber, Fernando Sarti, Germano Mendes de Paula, José
Rubens Dória Porto, Márcia Azanha Ferraz Dias de Moraes, 
Marcos Fava Neves, Maria Graça Derengowsky Fonseca, Matheus
Kfouri Marino, Mauro Thury de Vieira Sá, Rafael Oliva, Roberto
Vermulm and Victor Prochnik for their high-quality sectoral analy-
ses. The National Council for Scientific and Technological Research
(CNPq) and the Carlos Filho de Amparo Research Foundation  of
the state of Rio de Janeiro (FAPERJ) provided support for the activ-
ities carried out by the authors in the Industry and Competitiveness
Research Group of the Institute of Economics of the Federal
University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). This article is based on a
report produced for the Institute of Developing Economies, Japan
(Hamaguchi, 2003).
In this article, competitive firms are considered to be
those capable of formulating and implementing strate-
gies leading to sustained or expanded market position
in the segment of industry where they operate. To be
competitive, a firm’s strategies, capabilities and per-
formance must be coherent with the pattern of compe-
tition (PoC) prevalent in the activity in which it oper-
ates. Patterns of competition are defined as the collec-
tion of competitive driving factors required for success
in an industry. As competitiveness is defined at the
firm level, it is possible to consider, by aggregation,
that a sector is competitive if a large proportion of sec-
toral production value originates from competitive
firms at a given moment of time.
Competitiveness must be viewed as a dynamic
concept for two reasons. Firstly, it is associated with
previously accumulated capabilities of firms. Thus,
present capacity results from past strategic decisions
on where economic resources should be allocated.
Revealed market position or productive performance
indicate whether past strategies and capabilities were
adequate or not. In this sense, present capabilities or
market position do not necessarily ensure future com-
petitiveness. Secondly, important competitive driving
factors conforming the PoC may change due to strate-
gies pursued by innovative firms. Thus competitive-
ness must be evaluated against the expected, not nec-
essarily the current, pattern of competition at a given
moment of time.
Given the large number of possible factors inter-
vening in the PoC, it is necessary to organize them
according to some type of criterion. A simple and
workable criterion is one in which the factors are
organized according to the capacity of a firm to influ-
ence their direction and evolution. 
Some key factors (internal factors) lie within the
boundaries of the firm, where it has complete control.
Others (structural factors) are industry-specific and
have an equal level of importance for all firms operat-
ing in similar market segments. In general, individual
firms have only limited and indirect control over struc-
tural factors. Finally, there is a collection of drivers
(macro factors) which are associated with generic
framework conditions surrounding a firm and are
beyond its capacity to exert direct influence. Thus, a
competitive process has a systemic character, deter-
mined not only by the individual firm’s efforts, but
also by the nature of the industry in which it operates
and by economic and institutional aspects.
Sectoral analyses of competition are usually
based on structural or behavioural taxonomies. In this
article, drawing on the classical works of Steindl,
Labini, Scherer, Porter and Pavitt, we propose the
existence of four industrial groups - commodity indus-
tries; durable goods industries; traditional industries
and innovation carrier industries, each comprising
industrial sectors possessing similar competitive driv-
ers at the firm and structural levels.
Firms can be successful by offering: i) cost
advantages, ii) product differentiation, iii) responsive-
ness, or iv) technologically sophisticated products.
Very few firms can achieve excellence simultaneously
in every source of competitive advantage. Competitive
firms are those that focus on and develop coherent
strategies, capabilities and performance in the factors
making up the dominant pattern of competition in the
specific industry in which they operate.
Cost competition prevails in the commodity sec-
tor. Products are intrinsically undifferentiated, and
competitive firms are those capable of achieving the
lowest unit costs and the highest production volumes
possible, as well as having control over access to
inputs and efficient logistics systems, thus reducing
input and distribution costs.
Product differentiation is important in the durable
goods industries. Most advanced firms try to concen-
trate their capabilities in design and marketing func-
tions, while production may be extensively sub-con-
tracted. The mobilization and supervision of partners
is an essential source of competitive advantage. 
Responsiveness is a priority for traditional indus-
tries. Firms target market niches aiming at specific
consumers, stratified by income, age, etc. Business
capacity requirements3 are less strict than in other
industrial groups, but management and supervisory
skills are vital for success.
93C E P A L R E V I E W  8 2  •  A P R I L 2 0 0 4
INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS IN BRAZIL TEN YEARS AFTER ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION •  JOÃO CARLOS FERRAZ, DAVID KUPFER 
AND MARIANA IOOTTY
II
Competitiveness and patterns of competition
3 Understood as the overall set of skills, technical knowledge,
capabilities and experience of the firm.
Innovation carriers operate in specific market
segments. These firms must have strong technological
capabilities and access to updated science and tech-
nology laboratories.
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III
Institutional change and industrial performance
1. Economic liberalization
Economic liberalization, acceleration of trade and
cross-border capital flows and the diffusion of infor-
mation technologies delineated the international con-
text of the 1990s. In Brazil, industry faced two con-
secutive local competitive shocks – economic liberal-
ization and monetary stabilization. Reforms were
aimed at: i) economic deregulation, including the end
of price control mechanisms for goods and services
and the elimination of protected markets and other
regulatory constraints on foreign investment; ii) liber-
alization of the external sector, including the reduction
of trade tariffs and non-tariff barriers and deregulation
of the capital account, and iii) privatization of manu-
facturing industries and public utility services.  
Macroeconomic changes were equally important.
They were closely associated with the monetary
reform implemented under the Plano Real in 1994 and
with the subsequent return of capital inflows due to
increasing international liquidity and higher local
interest rates when compared to other national mar-
kets. The Plano Real successfully reduced the infla-
tionary spiral,4 resulting in the short term in growth of
real wages. That, associated with the resurgence of
credit lines for consumption, implied significant
increases in aggregate demand. The return of capital
inflows —direct investment rose from US$ 600 mil-
lion in 1993 to US$ 29.1 billion in 1998— was very
important for financing current account deficits, merg-
ers and acquisitions and capital investment.
Overvaluation of the national currency followed, and
it was pushed even further by a set of specific policies
defined by the Central Bank between 1994 and 1999.
The appreciation in the exchange rate and the
high interest rates, together with low tariffs and lower
barriers to the entry of foreign firms, imposed a new
competitive environment on industry. The immediate
result was a rapid deterioration in the trade balance.
Foreign capital inflows financed trade deficits but, at
the same time, the vulnerability of the country’s exter-
nal accounts increased to levels not compatible with
macroeconomic stability. Consequently, the negative
impacts of external financial dependence were
revealed not only in the weak growth of expansion-
related investments, but also in insufficient GDP
growth during the 1990s.
2. Industrial performance
a) The same structure of production, but with
many fewer workers
The share of Brazilian industry in the economy
did not change throughout the 1990s (Rocha and
Kupfer, 2002). Among the different industrial groups
(table 1), industrial commodities, durable goods and
food and beverages showed a better performance due
to the income effect generated by the Plano Real (in
the case of durable goods and food and beverages)
and/or better terms of trade and export performance
(industrial commodities and durable goods). The per-
formance of the innovation carriers was notably good
around 1995, as a result of better prospects created by
the success of the Plano Real, but this was followed by
a return of slow growth, as imports expanded signifi-
cantly and expectations of a better future were not ful-
filled.
4 Inflation rates went down from more than 1,000% in 1993 to
20% in 1995 and 5% in 1997.
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TABLE  1
Brazil: Output in different
industries, selected years
(1991=100)
1991 1995 1998 2000
Industrial commodities 100.0 109.6 126.8 138.2
Agriculture commodities 100.0 97.2 101.2 98.9
Traditional industry, 
except food and beverages 100.0 104.8 101.3 104.3
Food and beverages 100.0 121.6 128.9 130.5
Innovation carriers 100.0 120.0 105.6 108.2
Durable goods 100.0 147.6 133.9 148.6
Manufacturing 100.0 113.4 117.4 124.2
Source: Monthly Industrial Survey of the Brazilian Institute of
Geography and Statistics (IBGE).
FIGURE  1
Output and employment in Brazilian manu-
facturing industry, 1985-1999
Source: Monthly Industrial Survey and Monthly Employment
Survey of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics
(IBGE).
During the 1980s, employment levels fluctuated,
but closely followed the erratic evolution of produc-
tion. However, as shown in figure 1, since the early
1990s, the growth rates of production and employ-
ment started to diverge, particularly after 1993. That
was a very important change of trajectory, resulting in
the doubling of the output-to-labour ratio and higher
production efficiency between 1990 and 1999.5
Many economists identify the beginning of the
1990s as the break point in the relation between pro-
duction and employment. For Gonzaga (1996),
Amadeo and Soares (1996) and Bonelli (1996), this
increasing divergence indicates significant technolog-
ical change in the economy in terms of production
processes and/or organization. This explanation
places emphasis on intra- and inter-firm transforma-
tions, due to stabilization, trade liberalization and
economic deregulation that defined new efficiency
parameters for the strategic behaviour of corpora-
tions. In reality, as the analysis ahead will show, in
most sectors a large proportion of firms did indeed go
through a significant modernization process, strongly
biased towards cost rationalization. This rationaliza-
tion included the adoption of improved organization-
al techniques; the introduction of information tech-
nologies and equipment in administration and pro-
duction; changes in the product portfolio in the direc-
tion of greater specialization; subcontracting, de-ver-
ticalization, and increased use of imported compo-
nents. These changes directly implied a lower demand
for industrial employment, for the same level of pro-
duction. It is an open question whether employment
rates will ever catch up with past losses. 
b) Unchanged trade specialization
Foreign trade expanded significantly during the
1990s, from US$ 50 billion in 1990 to US$ 107 billion
in 2002. Between 1990 and 1993 trade levels and the
trade balance remained unchanged, suggesting that, per
se, tariff reform had only a minor impact on the inter-
national insertion of industry. After stabilization cum
currency overvaluation and further tariff reductions,
foreign trade expanded steadily up to 1997, especially
in the case of imports. Thus, while exports rose at a
moderate rate, imports trebled between 1990 and 1997.
As a result, the trade balance deteriorated and, after 14
years of surpluses, in 1997 the trade deficit reached
US$ 8.2 billion. Regardless of this expansion, howev-
er, Brazil’s share in world trade has declined from 1.4%
in the mid-1980s to 0.75% in 2001.
The 1997 Asian crisis triggered off a period of
uncertainty in Brazil. International liquidity and trade
receded and external vulnerability increased, leading to
an exchange crisis that resulted in the depreciation of
the Real and the introduction of a floating system in
January 1999. From then onwards imports declined,
but never below US$ 40 billion, while exports
increased steadily, resulting in trade surpluses in 20015 Most available evidence in Brazil is based on series of produc-
tion value, not on (ideal) series of value added. 
FIGURE  2
Brazil: Foreign trade, by industrial groups, 1989-2002
Source: GIC-IE data bank of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, based on information from Alice Data Bank.
and 2002. Concurrently with the expansion of total
Brazilian foreign trade, the ratios of exports and
imports to domestic production in manufacturing
increased steadily. Thus, between 1990 and 2001 the
export ratio increased from 8.0% to 14.9% while the
import ratio trebled, from 4.3% to 14.8%.
Figure 2 shows the imports and exports of four
industrial groups, reflecting the above-mentioned sub-
stantial expansion of Brazilian foreign trade and, most
important, the existence of sharp differences in the
nature of Brazilian imports and exports.6
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Firstly, industrial commodities, together with
durables and products of innovation carriers, were
responsible for 72% of the US$ 107 billion total trade
in 2002. Secondly, in industrial commodities, trade has
been expanding steadily but imports and exports are
quite balanced. Contrary to what might be expected,
imports of industrial commodities are quite large,
especially of chemicals. Thirdly, the pattern of foreign
trade in durables and products of innovation carriers is
quite different. Most Brazilian trade deficits are to be
found in these industrial groups. Between 1996 and
2001, annual deficits remained above US$ 10 billion.
Imports increased steadily, receding only in 2002, con-
currently with the acceleration of devaluation of the
Real. Exports reacted positively only after 2000.
Fourthly, agricultural commodities are responsible for
an important trade surplus, reaching US 20 billion in
2002; exports have been increasing steadily while
imports are not significant. Finally, trade flows in the
traditional industrial group were relatively stable, at
around US$ 10 billion for most of the decade. In short,
foreign trade expanded substantially but the nature of
the international insertion of Brazilian industry
remained unchanged
6 Commodities were divided into industrial and agricultural, while
durables and innovation carriers were merged together, due to sta-
tistical constraints. 
c) Ownership change, stagnation of capital and
R&D investment 
Unlike what occurred in the structure of produc-
tion, changes in the ownership structure of industry
were very pronounced. As shown in table 2, privatiza-
tion and mergers and acquisitions amounted to US$
128 billion between 1990 and 1999. As might be
expected, the value per transaction in privatization
was much higher than in mergers and acquisitions.
The first phase of privatization (1991-1995) involved
steelworks, mining and petrochemicals. In the second
half of the 1990s electrical power, financial services
and telecommunications were privatized. This last sec-
tor alone was responsible for US$ 30 billion in gov-
ernment revenue. Foreign investors were responsible
for 76.9% of the privatization operations and 71.4% of
the mergers and acquisitions.
According to Rocha and Kupfer (2002), among
the 300 largest corporations in Brazil, State-owned
firms reduced their market share (sales revenue) from
44.6% in 1991 to 24.3% in 1999; multinationals
expanded from 14.8% to 36.4%, while local capital
maintained its position. The authors suggest that own-
ership change among leading firms occurred in two
phases. Between 1991 and 1996, the share of State-
owned firms was transferred to private firms, regard-
less of their nationality, as a result of privatization of
industrial firms. Between 1996 and 1999 revenue was
transferred from national firms (State or privately
owned) to multinational firms. 
Asset acquisition and transfers reshaped the
country’s ownership landscape but did not lead to fur-
ther increases in capital investment. In Brazil, the
1990s was marked by only a modest expansion of
gross fixed capital. According to Bielschowsky
(1998), the share of industrial investment as a propor-
tion of GDP amounted to 2.2% in the period from
1988 to 1993, compared with 4.5% during the 1970s.
Between 1995 and 1997 investment rates increased to
3.2%, mostly associated with localized equipment ren-
ovation.
In fact, as shown in table 3, out of an universe of
72,000 industrial firms, with total sales of R$ 582 bil-
lion in 2000, 19,000 firms spent R$ 22 billion (or 3.8%
of sales revenue) on activities associated with mod-
ernization and innovation, ranging from training to
R&D. Of these 19,000, 15,500 firms focused their
expenditure on machinery acquisition. A smaller
group of firms (10% of total industrial firms) invested
0.64% of sales in R&D activities, but within this select
group there were large differences: the bigger the firm,
the greater its commitment to R&D.
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TABLE  2
Brazil: Privatization, mergers and acquisitions, 1990-1999
(Value in millions of dollars)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
Privatization (value) 0 2 096 2 447 3 026 620 1 123 4 829 16 087 27 540 3 797 61 564
Privatization 
(number of transactions) 0 4 14 6 9 7 13 20 31 9 113
Mergers and acquisitions 
(value)a 639 274 359 3 329 1 146 4 734 6 059 9 899 26 292 15 161 67 893
Mergers and acquisitions 
(number of transactions) 13 20 27 49 55 90 129 154 264 254 1 055
Source: GIC-IE databank of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, based on information from Thomson Financial Securities.
a According to declared value of transactions.
TABLE 3
Brazil: Net revenue of firms and expenditure on innovation activities, 2000
Expenditure on innovation activities
Number of firms Net revenue Total Machinery acquisition Internal R&D
(R$ million) Number Value Number Value Number Value
of firms of firms of firms
(R$ million) (R$ million) (R$ million)
72 005 582 406.1 19 165 22 343.8 15 540 11 667.3 7 412 3 741.6
Source: Industrial Survey on Technological Innovation (IBGE, 2000).
98
INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS IN BRAZIL TEN YEARS AFTER ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION •  JOÃO CARLOS FERRAZ, DAVID KUPFER 
AND MARIANA IOOTTY
C E P A L R E V I E W  8 2  •  A P R I L 2 0 0 4
IV
Industrial commodities:
Low cost for exports, differentiation 
for the local market
1. Pattern of competition then and now:
widening and deepening the search for 
lower costs
Commodity-related industries are engaged in the pro-
duction of intermediate inputs for industrial or final
consumption through large-scale production process-
es, and cost reduction is the driving factor in competi-
tion. Due to increasing competitive pressures from
developing countries, markets of developed countries
are being defended in favour of local firms by means
of explicit protectionist measures (see first two
columns of table 4).
Commodities are intrinsically undifferentiated,
and production efficiency and economies of scale are
ensured by three complementary means: highly capi-
tal-intensive plants, preferential access to inputs (raw
materials and energy sources) and transport logistics.
In such a context, large, multi-plant companies, oper-
ating internationally are capable of expanding the
frontiers of the important competitive driving factors.
During the last decade, local leading international
firms have become larger and more internationalized
through mergers and acquisitions.
At the level of the firm, core competences are
related to five sources of competitive advantages:
management, acquisition of or access to process tech-
nology, inputs, transport, and distribution networks
and preferential clients. The diffusion of information
systems based on microelectronics technologies has
provided the technical base for co-ordinating large-
scale operations and logistics.
The pattern of competition among firms has
remained closely associated with what is known as
homogeneous oligopoly. Competing firms try to gain
knowledge of market perspectives and behaviour of
rivals, on a global basis. Thus, for competitive suc-
cess, it is of fundamental importance to correctly
anticipate demand growth and/or effectively respond
to changes in price and quantity demanded by local
and international markets. 
Aggressive firms are those implementing merg-
er/acquisition-based investment strategies and
expanding capacity ahead of the growth in demand for
current products. Revenue possibilities have expanded
significantly in the past ten years, by means of widen-
ing product portfolio, exploring transportation assets
for third parties or selling-off surplus energy.
Preferential access to capital markets is of vital impor-
tance. In this respect, large and internationalized com-
panies have considerable advantages over firms oper-
ating single plants or in a limited number of national
markets. 
International competition in a context of liberal-
ized national economies has strengthened a historical
trend: although prices of most commodities fluctuate in
line with world economic cycles, relative prices have
shown a declining trend, raising serious  terms of trade
problems for commodity-dependent exporting nations.
Steel, pulp and paper and concentrated orange
juice, along with other commodity industries like soy-
beans and iron ore, are considered to be pillars of
Brazilian international competitiveness. In these
industries, in 2002, Brazil had a significant share of
international export markets: 80% in concentrated
orange juice, 37% in sugar, 34% in soybeans, 32% in
coffee and 16% in the meat industry. In 1990, the rel-
atively small size of leading companies and the low
levels of product value-added were the main competi-
tive challenges facing Brazilian commodity producers.
Since then these challenges have been only partially
addressed, while other sources of competitiveness
have been enhanced (see last two columns of table 4). 
TABLE  4
Brazil: Patterns of competition and competitiveness in commodities: then and now
Sources of competitive Cost-based POC Cost-based POC Brazilian Brazilian 
advantages Main factors of Main factors of competitiveness, competitiveness, 
competitiveness, 1990 competitiveness, 2002 1990 2002
Internal factors
Management Process control Efficient More efficient
Production Mass flow and energy No change Efficient More efforts in 
efficiency energy control
Sales Access to distribution Efficient More efficient
channels
Innovation Process technology Incipient local efforts Incipient local efforts
Structural factors
Standardization Prominence in low Low unit value for exports
value added segments and higher unit value for
local markets
Market Price, technical conformity No change
Access to international Low growth of demand Cyclical with changing
trade terms of trade
Company and plant Efficient plant size but Increased size but still 




Configuration Access to raw materials No change Good access to inputs More efficient
of industry and transport logistics and deficiencies in 
logistics
Specialized technical Reasonable efforts Reasonable efforts
services
Anti-dumping and trade Increased importance Trade restrictions Stronger restrictions
policy
Regulation and Environmental protection Increased importance Some restrictions Stronger restrictions
incentives regime High Still high
Cost of capital No change Tax distortions No change
Risk of cartelization, Privatization completed
incipient privatization but ownership not
consolidated
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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2. Competitiveness in 2002: Ownership consoli-
dation and product upgrading must continue
a) Increasing size of firms
Privatization of the steel industry and mergers
and acquisitions in pulp and paper have changed the
ownership landscape of the commodities industrial
group. Even so, when compared to their international
counterparts, Brazilian firms remain relatively small
and oriented towards the local market. Further
changes may occur, leading to greater concentration of
market structures and, perhaps, acquisitions by
Brazilian firms of other corporations abroad.
In the steel industry, two outstanding processes
have taken place: the privatization process initiated in
the late 1980s, and a substantial investment drive in
stages of the production process associated with the
generation of new, higher unit value products to be
sold on the local market.
Six large steel companies and six small ones were
privatized in Brazil, for a total of US$ 5.7 billion.
Local capital predominated in the privatization
process. Financial institutions accounted for 33.6%,
pension funds for 15% and industrial corporations for
21.8% of the total value of privatization. Due largely
to the privatization technique used (i.e., auctions), an
outstanding feature of the second half of the 1990s
was ownership instability and further asset transac-
tions. After privatization was completed 20 private
merger and acquisition transactions were carried out.
Between 1990 and 2000, only 17% of the production
units (measured in terms of physical capacity) had not
undergone at least one change in ownership. Besides
ownership changes, between 1994 and 2000 the indus-
try invested an average of US$ 1.4 billion. This was
rather unexpected, given the country’s macroeconom-
ic uncertainties and those arising from the privatiza-
tion process itself. Most investments were focused in
the rolling area, enabling product upgrading. 
In pulp and paper, at the end of the twentieth cen-
tury, there were  220 companies. In 2000, total sales
reached US$ 7.5 billion; the largest 11 integrated com-
panies were responsible for two-thirds of this total,
showing the importance of plant- and company-level
economies of scale for this industry. During that year,
the four largest producers of pulp accounted for 70%
of total production. In the paper segment, concentra-
tion levels are lower, but they have been increasing
since 1990. In that year, the five largest producers
were responsible for 39.5% of total production; ten
years later that share had increased to 51.4%.
Ownership concentration levels were increased
through a very active process of mergers and acquisi-
tions, as shown in table 5. 
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TABLE  5
Brazil: Main mergers and acquisitions in the pulp and paper sector, 1992-2001
Company sold Controlling company Date Share Product
Simão Votorantim 1992 100% Printing paper
Mad. Saguário Orsa 1996 100% Wrapping paper
Nicolaus Papeis Md Papeis 1997 100% Special paper + cardboard
Klabin Tissue Kimberly Klabin 1998 50% Tissue
Inpacel Champion / International Paper 1998 100% Lightweight coated paper
Celpav Votorantim 1988 100% Printing paper
Igaras Klabin/Riverwwod 2000 100% Pulp / kraftliner
Klabin Joint Venture until 2002 2000 50+50% Newsprint
Norske Skog
Jarcel Orsa 2000 100% Pulp
Pisa Norske Skog 2000 100% PAR + newsprint
Champion L. International Paper 2000 100% Pulp + printing paper.
Bahia Sul Suzano 2001 100% Pulp + paper
Cenibra JBP 2001 100% Pulp
Portucel Suzano + Sonae 2001 28% Pulp + paper
Aracruz Votorantim 2001 26% Pulp
Source: Fonseca (2002).
TABLE 6
Brazil: Verticalization and supply contracts in the pasteurized orange juice 
production chain
Selling Distribution Relation Packaging Relation between Processing Relation between 
company (1) company (2) between (1) and (2) company (3) (2) and (3) company (4) (3) and (4)
Nestle Nestle Vertical Cargill Contract Cargill Vertical
Dan’ Fresh Danone Vertical Citrovita Contract Citrovita Vertical
Leco Leco Vertical Citrovita Contract Citrovita Vertical
Yes Paulista Contract Cargill Contract Cargill Vertical
Parmalat Parmalat Vertical Parmalat Vertical Parmalat Vertical
Carrefour Carrefour Vertical Cargill Contract Cargill Vertical
Sendas Sendas Vertical Nova América Contract Nova América Vertical
Source: Compiled from Neves and Marino (2002).
In the citrus industry there are two segments. In
the frozen concentrated orange juice segment, firms
control the processing stage and co-ordinate the associ-
ated logistics (from orange plantations to packaging).
Most active firms have moved to the south of the USA,
acquiring or investing in new processing units and even
some plantations. Co-ordination capabilities have been
developed and important clients, like Coca-Cola, have
transferred the management of their production units in
the United States to a Brazilian company. This is an
important change from the early 1990s, due to the need
to sidestep import restrictions. The industry has also
become more concentrated: the export share of the four
largest producers increased from 70% to 90% between
1997 and 2001. But these firms still remain distant
from final consumers: they are typical commodity pro-
ducers, relying for competitiveness on the low cost of
their undifferentiated product.
In the pasteurized orange juice segment, which
has been expanding rapidly in Brazil, the market struc-
ture is different. As shown in table 6, in their search for
economies of scale firms have followed different ver-
ticalization strategies. At one extreme, close to the
resource base, processing firms have verticalized into
packaging operations. At the other extreme, close to
the final consumer, companies have incorporated dis-
tribution activities. In most cases, economic relations
between these two extremes involve supply contracts
between different companies. 
b) Low unit value for exports, high unit value for
the local market
Brazilian commodity producers supply interna-
tional markets predominantly with low unit value
products. Since the early 1990s they have consolidat-
ed their competitive position by investing in distribu-
tion networks and closer relations with large clients.
For the Brazilian market, however, firms have evolved
towards widening and upgrading their product portfo-
lio. Compared with exports, sales to the local market
have higher unit value. This dual track strategy has
been consolidated throughout the years. It remains to
be seen whether the experience gained in the local
market may prove useful for conquering new and
more valuable segments in international markets in the
years to come.
In 1999, in value terms, the world share of
Brazilian steel semi-finished products was 14.1%, but
in galvanized sheets it was only 0.4%, while the share
of semi-finished products in total Brazilian steel
exports increased from 39.2% in 1990 to 68.4% in
2001, in terms of physical production. This expansion
was attained in spite of the context of increasing pro-
tectionist barriers. In the local market, however, total
steel consumption increased 89% between 1992 and
2001, while the growth in galvanized sheets reached
402%. Over 50% of total demand came from the auto-
motive and civil construction sectors. 
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TABLE 7
Brazil and other selected countries: Production costs of cold rolled sheet steel, 
April 2001
(US$/dispatched ton)
United States Japan Germany United Kingdom S. Korea China Brazil
Raw materials 115 106 109 105 112 118 103
Coal 27 27 26 24 28 28 37
Iron ore 55 56 62 58 59 75 40
Scrap / Direct reduction iron 33 26 21 23 25 15 26
Other raw materials 172 150 148 153 134 152 135
Labour costsa 154 142 136 113 62 26 57
Hourly wage 38 36 34 27.6 13 1.25 10.5
Total operational costs 441 398 392 371 308 297 295
Financial costs 39 60 40 46 42 50 67
Depreciation 29 40 30 26 30 30 32
Interest 10 20 10 20 12 20 35
Total cost 480 458 432 417 350 347 362
Source: Paula (2002)
a In man-hours per ton. 
The high level of competitiveness in low value
added products is also reflected in the industry’s cost
structure. As may be seen from table 7, the competi-
tiveness of the Brazilian steel industry stems from the
low level of labour and iron ore costs. Financial costs
and the cost of coal have long been the basic source of
competitive disadvantage.
Cost advantages in pulp production are quite sim-
ilar. In 2001, Brazilian industry led in the production
of short fibre pulp, with a 19.4% share of total world
supply, a 7-point increase over the 1990 market share.
Between 1990 and 2001 this branch expanded by 9.5%
annually, surpassed only by the expansion of
Indonesia, a latecomer to the industry. In value terms,
exports increased from US$ 556 million in the early
1990s to US$ 1.3 billion in 2000.
In paper production the picture is very different,
both in terms of volume of production and share in
world markets. In 2000, Brazil produced 7,188 tons of
paper, while international production reached 323,295
tons. Although the Brazilian industry grew by 4.3%
during the 1990s, its international market share for all
types of papers is very small and has remained
unchanged:  2.0% in 1991 and 2.2% in 2000. 
Five types of papers accounted for more than
50% of exports in 2000 – printing/writing, non-coated
paper, toilet paper, cardboard and kraft liner. Ten years
before, the proportion was higher, at 70%. Since 1990,
however, in value terms paper exports have remained
below US$ 1 billion in most years. Thus, in 2000, 62%
of total paper production was sold in the local market;
22% represented self-consumption by the producers
and only 15% was exported.
The citrus industry follows a similar dual track
strategy. In the frozen concentrated orange juice
(FCOJ) segment, Brazil is an international leader; in
the pasteurized orange juice (POJ) segment sales are
directed to the local market. The latter requires more
sophisticated industrial operations and is very close to
the final consumer market, requiring significant mar-
keting efforts. 
During the 1990s 50% of total world orange juice
and 80% of FCOJ were produced in Brazil, generat-
ing, on average, US$ 1 billion in foreign exchange.
Like other commodity producers, Brazil is very
dependent on the fluctuations of international prices.
While total exports of FCOJ expanded from 785 mil-
lion tons in 1990 to 1,234 million in 2000, export rev-
enues reached a peak of US$ 1.3 billion in 1995,
decreasing to US$ 800 million in 2001. 
Most developed markets for FCOJ are stagnating,
while developing regions are expanding their con-
sumption. It is estimated that West Europeans con-
sume 24 litres of fruit juice per year, while East
Europeans consume 5 litres per year, having increased
their consumption 80% between 1995 and 2000. This
context has led to reactions from important con-
sumer/producer countries through the imposition of
trade barriers, like the 56% ad valorem tariff imposed
by the United States. In the POJ segment market per-
spectives are positive. While annual consumption lev-
els of POJ in the USA reach 40 litres, in Brazil total
orange juice consumption is around 20 litres/year. Of
that, only 1 litre is POJ, but annual rates of growth in
this segment are very high, at around 30%.
c) Cost control
Throughout the 1990s, companies placed consid-
erable emphasis on actions closely associated with the
reduction of direct costs, especially raw materials and
transport. Lowering energy costs was an important
investment item, given its high weight in total costs
and the supply crisis the country faced in 2001.
Companies also consolidated their capabilities to oper-
ate technically updated plants efficiently, but they still
relied on capital goods suppliers to define the techno-
logical possibilities of improving processes.
The investment drive in the steel industry had a
direct impact on efficiency levels. Even though output
levels remained around 25 million tons per year, mod-
ernization of installations and sharp cuts in employ-
ment levels – at an annual average rate of 7.6%
between 1989 and 2000  resulted in corresponding
marked improvements in productivity levels, from 11
to 5.4 man-hours per ton, between 1991 and 2000 (see
figure 3).
Investments in pulp and paper were not as pro-
nounced as in steel, but in order to maintain their com-
petitiveness firms expanded backward integration
towards rationalized eucalyptus forests. In 1990, out
of 64 million hectares planted by the industry, euca-
lyptus forests occupied 42 million and pine forests 20
million. Ten years later, the area of pine plantations
remained constant while 100 million hectares of euca-
lyptus forests were planted.
The competitiveness of the citrus sector also lies
in its privileged access to inputs. There have been
considerable technological efforts to improve the pro-
ductivity of the agricultural base of the industry. The
most significant achievement was the 2002 DNA
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sequencing of the genome of the bacteria Xyllela
Fastidiosa, which causes diseases in the crops.
According to Neves and Marino (2002), productivity
has expanded due to increasingly intensive plantation
management and greater use of fertilizers, while the
total area planted has decreased. 
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FIGURE  3
Brazil: Output and employment in the steel industry, 1988-2001
Source: Paula, 2002
V
Durable goods: Inward internationalization and
catching up in middle income segments
1. The pattern of competition then and now:
internationalization and differentiation
The market structure of durable industries, like the
consumer electronics and automobile industries, is
characterized by differentiated and concentrated oli-
gopolies, with just a few firms operating in global
markets. Leading firms are those capable of success-
fully exploiting economies of scale and scope. The
1990 international competitive drivers have been fur-
ther stressed (see first two columns of table 8). For
competitive firms, differentiation requires constant
introduction of products with new sets of attributes.
For this purpose, firms invest in product development,
marketing, and after-sales service through an author-
ized retailers’ network. Firms are constantly trying to
create or expand market segments, in order to pay off
the investments costs associated with product devel-
opment and new or renewed installations. 
To be competitive it is mandatory to operate
under strict minimum requirements of technical and
management economies of scale. Scale is therefore a
significant barrier to entry, and firms must implement
investment strategies that anticipate market growth. It
is also important to operate production systems with
increasing levels of technical efficiency, quality and
flexibility. These needs imply the intensive use of
microelectronics-based automation and organizational
techniques oriented towards continuous improvement
of production processes. 
Due to the heavy weight of components in total
production cost, vertical disintegration has increased,
combined with new forms of linkages between assem-
blers and suppliers. In relation to suppliers, essential
competitive factors are: delivery times; price; techni-
cal conformity; stable industrial contracts incorporat-
ing the transfer of inventory administration costs to
suppliers; and joint development of components. The
prevailing international context of trade liberalization
has induced firms to develop global sourcing systems.
For some lines of electronics-based consumer goods,
there has also been an important trend towards sub-
contracting the production of final goods to special-
ized contract manufacturing firms in developing coun-
tries like Mexico and China.
Investments made in these sectors normally
induce dynamic effects in a host economy, directly or
indirectly, including changing and upgrading the
nature of employment of a region. This is why local
authorities offer generous fiscal incentives to attract
these sets of activities.
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TABLE 8
Brazil: Patterns of competition (POC) and competitiveness in durables, then and now
Sources of POC based on differentiation POC based on differentiation Brazilian Brazilian
competitive Main driving factors Main driving factors competitiveness competitiveness 
advantages in 1990 in 2002 in 1990 in 2002
Internal factors
Management Co-ordination capabilities Lack of capabilities Closing gap 
Production Organizational flexibility Organizational rigidity Closing gap 
Sales Brand image No change, with increasing Brand image Closing gap 
importance of information 
technologies
Innovation Product and component Local design capabilities Demobilization of local 




Segmentation by quality Increased Low segmentation Specialization in middle
and marketing range segments
Market Price, brand, technological Increased High price, low Closing gap
content, technical assistance technological content
Regional and global trade Increased Distant from Increased exports;
international networks resistance to imports
Firm and plant level Increased Scale deficiencies in Optimization through
economies of scale and scope most product lines specialization
Configuration Assembler-supplier linkage, Increased Incipient linkages Closer relations with 




standardization No change Adequate Adequate
Property rights No change Low levels of Enforcement of property
compliance rights 
Regulation and Consumer protection No change Incipient legislation Stricter legislation
incentives regime Consumer credit No change Non-existent Variation according to
macroeconomic conditions
Fiscal incentives No change Non-existent Extensive use of local 
incentives
Source: Prepared by the authors.
In Brazil, the consumer electronics and automo-
tive industries were strongly impacted by the Plano
Real and trade liberalization. On the one hand, an
“income effect” sharply expanded demand levels; on
the other hand, trade liberalization imposed new and
more rigid benchmarks for product attributes, such as
price and technical specifications.
During the 1990s, firms in Brazil not only
demonstrated the capacity to resist international com-
petition but also to implement pro-active strategies to
exploit the expansion in demand through investment
in new production capacity and higher levels of
imports of parts and components (see the last two
columns of table 8). New entries took the form of
green field investment, especially in automobile
assembly, and acquisition of existing auto parts 
businesses. New entrants in consumer electronics
combined both investment modes. By 2002, the inter-
nationalization of ownership, already a structural 
feature in these industries, was practically complete.
Representatives of most international leading players
are currently operating in Brazil. As a result, Brazil
has become an important production platform for mid-
dle-range products, such as sub-compact cars, on the
international scene. Given the oscillating, low-growth
trends of the Brazilian economy throughout the
decade, however, most firms have yet to make full use
of the new installations.
2. Competitiveness in 2002: successful catching
up, but demand constraints still impose limits
on further growth 
a) Capacity expansion and internationalization 
In consumer electronics, the market expansion of
the first half of the 1990s induced the entry of new
players and the growth of existing competitors. New
investments (and entrants) were observed in the tele-
vision and video segment, while mergers and acquisi-
tions were more pronounced in the freezers, refrigera-
tors, cookers and washing machines segments.
The industry went through two different phases.
After the period of recession in the early 1990s, man-
ufacturers of audio and video  products improved per-
formance due to significant increases in consumption
levels, mostly among lower social classes. For
instance, sales of TV sets, which were about 2 million
units in 1990, increased to the unprecedented level of
8.5 million units by 1996. But, just as production
expanded in that period, it quickly contracted during
the second half of the 1990s, falling to nearly half the
1996 volume  by the end of the decade (Sá, 2002). 
The high levels of credit default among low-
budget consumers damaged the sales of major shop-
ping outlets, leading to the bankruptcy of some lead-
ing chains and thus reducing the sales revenue of most 
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TABLE  9
Brazil: New assembly plants in the automotive sector, 1996-2001
Firm Type of product Location Year
Volkswagen Engines São Carlos-SP 1996
Volkswagen Lorries and buses  Resende-RJ 1996
Honda Cars Sumaré-SP 1997
Mitsubishi Light commercial vehicles Catalão-GO 1998
Renault Cars and engines São José dos Pinhais-PR 1998
Toyota Cars Indaiatuba-SP 1998
Daimler Chrysler Cars Campo Largo- PR 1999
GM Components Mogi das Cruzes-SP 1999
Volkswagen-Audi Cars São José dos Pinhais-PR 1999
Mercedes Cars Juiz de Fora – MG 2000
GM Cars Gravataí-RS 2000
Iveco Engines Sete Lagoas-MG 2000
Ford Cars Camaçari-BA 2001
Nissan Light commercial vehicles São José dos Pinhais-PR 2001
Peugeot-Citroen Cars and engines Porto Real-RJ 2001
Source: Sarti (2002)
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electronics manufacturers. As a result, the consumer
electronics industry went through a reorganization
process which included the bankruptcy of some local
firms and the closing down of local operations by for-
eign firms. 
The inverted V shape of television sales shows
how volatile the Brazilian economy has been and,
from a technical perspective, how production of con-
sumer electronics items can be expanded and reduced
very quickly, enabling firms to respond to positive and
negative evolution in demand. 
In car assembly, green field investment prevailed.
Table 9 shows the impressive addition of new capaci-
ty to the segment during the second half of the 1990s
both by existing producers and newcomers. 
While new entrants and plants in car assembly
increased competitive pressures, investments in auto
parts also brought in new firms, but not via green field
projects. Following international trends, mergers and
acquisitions was the dominant mode of entry. Hence,
as only a small proportion of resources were devoted
to production expansion, higher rates of international-
ization and market concentration were observed. In
1994, local capital accounted for at least 50% of total
capital, sales and investment, but by the end of the
decade, the share of locally owned firms was down to
approximately 25%.
The performance of this industrial group was
very much influenced by the evolution of aggregate
demand. For example, in 2000 the sales revenue of the
audio and video markets plummeted to US$ 3.5 bil-
lion: far below the US$ 8.1 billion reached in 1996.
Idle capacity is more pronounced in auto producers, as
they are not able to shut down capacity as easily as
producers in the consumer electronics sector.
b) Specialization and modernization
By 2002, the Brazilian consumer electronics and
automotive industries became specialized in middle-
range segments. Firms invested in upgrading technical
specifications to international levels, while relying on
established technology standards, imported compo-
nents and imported finished products for the lower and
upper-end segments. This option can be explained by
two factors: firstly, the size and income profile of local
demand, and secondly, the competitive pressure from
imports, which imposed strict minimum levels of
product attributes.
This industrial branch has yet to compensate the
volatile local demand with greater exposure to inter-
national trade; exports in the audio and video seg-
ments have remained at around US$ 350 million since
1990, representing a very small proportion of local
sales; imports of final goods were around US$ 150
million, increasing to US$ 450 million when local
demand expanded. The main destinations of exports
were Argentina, Hungary, Italy and Spain. The infant
but growing exports have not been able to compensate
for the significant increase in the value of imports of
electronic components from South Korea and Japan,
however. According to Sá (2002), although total trade
deficit in electronic components decreased from US$
1.5 billion in 1997 to US$ 1.1 billion in 2000, the lack
of production capacity in this segment constitutes a
major structural weakness of Brazil.
In the automotive sector, regardless of owner-
ship changes, investments were significant and the
Brazilian competitive gap was significantly reduced
in terms of product attributes and efficiency levels of
installations. In aggregate terms, as shown in table
10, the number of cars produced per worker per year
has trebled between 1990 and 2001, reaching 21.3
units. At the same time employment fell from
117,396 posts in 1990 to 85,257 in 2001, in spite of
new  investments.
TABLE  10
Brazil: Employment and productivity in the car assembly sector, 1990-2001
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2001
Employment
117,396 105,664 107,134 101,857 83,049 85
257
Labour 
productivitya 7.8 10.2 14.8 17.7 19.1 21.3
Source: Sarti (2002)
a Units per worker in the year in question.
At this point, it is important to call attention to
changes in the nature of assembly-supplier relations in
the automotive sector. Firstly, suppliers were induced
to set up production facilities very close to assembly
units, to enable de-verticalization and just-in-time
operations. Most new plants were designed under the
condominium concept, in which specific areas were
designated to be occupied by selected auto parts cor-
porations that would enjoy exclusive relations with
assemblers. In return they had to share investment
costs. Secondly, in line with new forms of relations,
auto parts companies –now for the most part sub-
sidiaries of key international players– developed
intense intra-firm trade, thereby expanding auto parts
imports from their parent transnational corporations.
Between 1989 and 2001, auto parts imports increased
300%, reaching US$ 4.3 billions in 2001, with a trade
deficit of US$ 445 million.
Within a context of capacity expansion, modern-
ization and ownership change, auto sales in Brazil
increased from 713,000 units in 1990 to 1.9 million in
1997, going down to 1.6 million units in 2001. Most
auto assemblers operating in Brazil focused on the
subcompact segment, with engines in the 1000 to
2000cc range. In 2001, 71% of domestic production
was related with this segment. The international trade
of the Brazilian auto industry was marked by strong
complementarities with Argentina: after a brief expan-
sion in the post-trade liberalization years, the level of
cars imports was reduced to US$ 2 billion in the
2000/2001 biennium. Almost 66% of these imports
came from Argentina. By the same token, 44% of
Argentine auto imports come from Brazil.  
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VI
Traditional industries: competitive constraints 
are still defined by unequal income levels
1. The pattern of competition then and now: 
market segmentation and networking
Market segmentation is an inherent feature of tradi-
tional industries. Variety prevails, in terms of number
and technical specifications of products, nature of pro-
duction processes (assembly, flow and batch produc-
tion), minimum size of technical economies of scale,
levels of verticalization and outsourcing, and organiza-
tional format of the companies.
Industrial sectors are very sensitive to oscillations
in demand, and responsiveness is the key competitive
driver of these industries (see first two columns of table
11). Responsiveness is important for two reasons.
Firstly, through considerable marketing efforts, compa-
nies constantly try to introduce new designs and create
niches to impose themselves in their markets. If suc-
cessful, immediate demand expansion follows. When
this happens, they must increase production levels to
correspond with growth in demand, while keeping
delivery times under control. Secondly, demand levels
are subject to seasonal oscillations, imposing the need
for constant adaptation of production levels.
Compliance with these two sources of oscillations in
demand is facilitated by the relative technical simplici-
ty of production processes and the low investment
costs in expanding capacity. Apart from the importance
of imposing new consumer habits, investment in these
industries is closely associated with changes in demand
levels.
The degree of market segmentation is defined by
the size and income profile of a given consumer popu-
lation. The higher the income level, the less relative
importance the price attribute will have and the greater
the value of attributes associated with satisfying partic-
ular specifications of clients. Nationwide, if high
income levels prevail, firms with similar competences
will co-exist, while operating in different market seg-
ments. In contrast, when income differentials are sig-
nificant, firms with very differentiated competences
will co-exist in similar markets. It is important to note
that, given the relatively low unit value of traditional
products in consumer baskets, high levels of product
renovation and differentiated competences among
firms may prevail, even in a context of very unequal
income levels, if the absolute size of the market is con-
siderable, as in the case of Brazil.
Entrepreneurial skills for promoting product reno-
vation and keeping organizational formats up to date
–especially in regard to design, marketing, quality con-
trol systems and relations with suppliers– are essential
for competitive success in traditional industries. The
basic sources of technical change for these industries
are the equipment and input supplier industries. In the
past ten years an increasing role has been played by
information technology-related equipment and chemi-
cal inputs. Those corporations capable of gaining
access to such equipment and inputs on better terms
will enjoy competitive advantages. 
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TABLE  11
Brazil: Patterns of competition and competitiveness in traditional industries: 
then and now
Sources of POC based on responsiveness POC based on responsiveness Brazilian Brazilian
competitive advantages Main drivers, 1990 Main drivers, 2002 competitiveness, 1990 competitiveness, 2002
Internal factors
Management Entrepreneurial skills Increasing importance of Heterogeneity, with Increased heterogeneity:
creating new market a core group of leaders close to the 
segments competitive firms international frontier
Production Quality control Greater flexibility and Incipient Increased competence
outsourcing
Sales Market information Increasing importance of Incipient Increased competence
marketing
Innovation Embodied technology, Increasing importance Strategy based on Improvements in few 
learning by doing of design copying segments and products
Structural factors
Segmentation by levels of Increased Limited segmentation Inequalities remained but
income and type of product due to inequalities in segmentation increased
income levels 
Market Price, brand, delivery times, Increased Low use of product Greater use of price and 
customer orientation attributes customer orientation 
attributes
Local and international trade Increased importance of Potential large size of Demand fluctuation due to  
insertion in international national market but economic instability; 
supply chains reliance on local trade; incipient international 
threats from imports exposure
Economies of agglomeration Great increase Limited to few Increased number of local 
and networking segments clusters; relocation to 
Configuration lower labour cost regions
of industry Efficient supply of equipment No change Deficient supply of Expansion of equipment 
equipment imports with better
price/efficiency ratio
Metrology, standardization, No change Low efforts and lack Improvements restricted
certification; market and of coordination to medium-sized and 
technical information; training large companies
Anti-dumping policy Increased, due to preferential Low level of use Increased use in local 
access under bilateral markets
agreements
Regime of regulation Competition and consumer No change Infant level, unfair Increased but still
and incentives protection policies competition from incipient importance; 
informal sector unfair competition from 
informal sector remains
Support for SMEs Increase in size and scope Lack of effective Improvements in support 
instruments for management but lack 
of financial instruments 
remains
Tax system No change Anti-competitive bias Bias remains
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Privileged access to suppliers is related to size:
smaller companies can survive in specific market nich-
es, but they may face economic and financial difficul-
ties in mobilizing the resources they need to fully
exploit equipment- and input-related sources of com-
petitive advantage. Given the inherent economic vari-
ety of these industries, this may be the basic reason for
the growing trend for companies to organize them-
selves horizontally and/or vertically around local pro-
duction clusters. Through such local clusters, compa-
nies can benefit from another source of competitive
advantage: economies of agglomeration, through
which they share costs associated with all aspects of
their economic activity: infrastructure, labour and other
inputs, design and marketing, information systems, etc.
Traditional industries are among the oldest indus-
trial activities in Brazil, and competitive heterogeneity
was and still is an important structural feature. The
coexistence of very differentiated levels of compe-
tence among firms in each sector –and even among
stages of production, within a given firm– can be
directly associated with the country’s remarkably
uneven income distribution profile.
In 1990 competitiveness was directly associated
with size: large firms were likely to be more compe-
tent than their smaller counterparts. Larger firms were
able to explore different market segments, to invest in
modernization and to export. The analysis of textile,
footwear and furniture industries indicates that, in
2002, such structural feature still prevailed, although,
as shown in the last two columns of table 11, some
progress has been observed. The rate of product reno-
vation has increased, through explicit and increased
design efforts. Production modernization has been
facilitated by the incorporation of more efficient
machinery. Local clusters have emerged and are being
consolidated in different industrial segments and
regions of the country, while companies have further
explored low labour cost opportunities, by transferring
installations to the Northeast of the country.
2. Competitiveness in 2002: increasing respon-
siveness, but heterogeneity still prevails
a) Asymmetric capabilities
The footwear industry exports 30% of its total
production, while the textiles and garment industries
focus on the domestic market. Until the mid-1990s,
most footwear exports were directed to low-end mar-
ket segments, where the price attribute is important. In
spite of competitive pressure from Chinese producers,
export performance has evolved positively during the
1990s. As shown in table 12, exports increased from
US$ 1.1 billion in 1990 to US$ 1.6 billion in 2001.
Unit prices have also increased, indicating that the
industry is upgrading its product portfolio. It is neces-
sary to bear in mind that, since 1999, devaluation has
helped exports.
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TABLE  12
Brazil: Footwear exports, selected years
Year Value (US$ million) Pairs (millions) Average unit price (US$)
1990 1 107 143 7.74
1995 1 414 138 10.25
2000 1 547 163 9.52
2001 1 615 171 9.43
Source: Costa (2002).
TABLE  13
Number of establishments, employment and sales revenue in the textile, chemical
fibres and garment industries, 2000
Chemical fibres Textiles Garments
Establishments 25 3,305 18,797
Employment (1,000 jobs) 15 339 1,233
Production (1,000 ton/year) 640 1,750 1,287
Annual sales (US$ billion) 1.4 16.6 27.2
Source: Prochnik (2002).
Other factors have also contributed to the sector’s
international performance: fiscal incentives and export
credits; the consolidation of gains from economies of
agglomeration, especially in the southern state of Rio
Grande do Sul, and the accumulated export experi-
ence. Nevertheless, labour costs still provide an
important competitive edge to Brazilian production. In
1993 labour costs in Brazil were US$ 1 per man-hour,
compared to US$ 0.5 in China, US$ 2.5 in Korea and
US$ 8 in Spain. A study by Costa (2002) demonstrates
the importance of the exchange rate to this export sec-
tor. During the 1994/1998 period, when the Real was
overvalued, total employment fell by 56,000, but as
demand expanded –between 1999 and 2000 exports
increased by US$ 270 million (26 million pairs of
shoes)– companies quickly contracted 29,000 more
workers. 
In the textiles sector there are important econom-
ic differences between the three most important seg-
ments –textiles, chemical fibres and garments – as
shown in table 13. 
The combined sales of 22,000 establishments,
employing 1.5 million workers, amounted to US$ 45.2
billion in 2000. The production of chemical fibres is
technically more complex and the plants are larger and
generally controlled by foreign-owned firms. At the
other extreme, in the garment industry, small and
medium-sized locally-owned firms prevail, employing
1.2 million workers in 18,000 establishments. 
In contrast with the footwear industry, the inter-
national performance of the Brazilian textile industry,
as shown in table 14, was never economically signifi-
cant, even though in some segments, such as the gar-
ment industry, the competitiveness drivers are similar
to those prevailing in the footwear industry.
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TABLE  14
Brazil: World trade and Brazil’s share in the textiles and garment sectors, 1995-2000
Textiles 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
World trade (US$ billion) 111.1 113.6 119.3 112.5 113.0 126.1
Brazil’s share in exports (%) 0.90 0.89 0.86 0.79 0.73 0.71
Brazil’s share in imports (%) 1.23 0.98 1.01 0.95 0.79 0.88
Garments
World trade (US$ billion) 124.0 128.7 141.9 149.3 150.0 165.5
Brazil’s share in exports (%) 0.24 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.17
Brazil’s share in imports (%) 0.30 0.29 0.32 0.25 0.14 0.11
Source: Compiled from Prochnik (2002).
b) Modernization and relocation of production
A modernization drive was also observed in this
industrial group, but with very special features, includ-
ing relocation towards the low-cost Northeast region
of Brazil.
In the footwear industry, companies modernized
production processes and product portfolio, including
the introduction of automated equipment and new
organizational techniques associated with raising qual-
ity and decreasing waste and down time. There were
also concerted efforts to increase product lines in asso-
ciation with higher process flexibility. 
In the textiles and garment sector, modernization
was stimulated by three sources of dynamism. Firstly,
during the first half of the 1990s, the Plano Real
induced positive expectations in relation to growth of
demand; secondly, starting in 1995, the National
Economic and Social Development Bank, BNDES,
financed a US$ 2 billion programme for machinery
acquisition, especially for larger firms; and thirdly,
import liberalization and an overvalued Real on one
hand, and advances in technology, on the other,
offered the possibility of importing updated machinery
at lower prices. Investments in new machinery implied
changes in production processes, with a negative
impact on employment levels in the sector, which, as
in other countries, fell substantially (by 40.7%)
between 1990 and 2000.
Concurrently, a significant number of companies
in these sectors migrated from the Southeast to the
Northeast (table 15), looking for lower labour costs
and generous tax incentives, including VAT exemp-
tions, the provision of physical infrastructure and
export credit lines. 
1. The pattern of competition then and now: the
increasing role of innovation
Innovation carriers are firms that engage in activities
capable of inducing progress in other economic activ-
ities, through technical change incorporated in capital
goods and components they produce. Market segmen-
tation is the main feature of the demand for such
goods. Since their products have specific applications,
in general each firm competes directly with very few
rivals. Over the years, and with the pervasive spread of
information technologies, the leaders in this sector
have evolved from supplying equipment and have
become providers of technical solutions and services
to clients. 
Firms of this type must devote considerable
resources to research and development (R&D) activi-
ties, reflecting the fact that the most important com-
petitive driver is the capacity to implement product
innovations and to address particular demands of
clients in specific market segments (see first two
columns of table 16). Innovation capabilities are also
the most important barrier to entry. Growing R&D
costs have led to the emergence of different forms of
alliances among firms, mostly with the aim of diluting
technological risks. These features mean that there is
an important role for public or private research 
centres.
Due to the strategic role of innovation carriers,
nations with complex industrial structures have always
implemented active policies to promote and consoli-
date the competitiveness of these enterprises in local
and international markets. In addition to support for
technological development, import restrictions,
favourable financing conditions, government purchas-
ing power and fiscal incentives are frequently used
mechanisms. 
Of all industrial groups, Brazilian innovation car-
riers suffered the worst consequences of economic lib-
eralization. Before this process, firms had reasonable
levels of production capacity and well-qualified
human resources, especially in mechanical engineer-
ing, as the result of a long learning process associated
with an expanding local market and active industrial
policies of the 1970s and 1980s. Even then, however,
most producers of mechanical engineering and elec-
tronics-based equipment were not competitively
strong, displaying high levels of verticalization and
diversification, dependence on foreign technological
suppliers, and merely incipient relations with the local
scientific infrastructure.
In the course of the 1990s, producers of mechan-
ical engineering and telecommunication equipments
and computers shared a common feature: substantial
strengthening of their production capabilities.
However, this was not enough to resist foreign com-
petitive pressures. New entrants from abroad acquired
local firms, and intra-firm imports were extensively
used (see last two columns of table 16).
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TABLE  15
Brazil: Share of different regions in textile production, 1990-2000
Sector Northeast Southeast South Total
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
Fibres 24.9 35.4 55.2 42.6 17.2 21.7 100
Fabrics 17.6 21.5 65.6 62.0 12.8 13.7 100
Knitwear 2.8 10.0 39.9 35.2 55.7 53.5 100
Garments 8.0 11.3 66.6 56.1 21.6 25.4 100
Total 13.3 19.6 56.8 49.0 26.8 28.5 100
Source: Prochnik 2002
VII
Innovation carriers: progress, setbacks and 
a fragile competitiveness
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TABLE  16
Brazil: Patterns of competition (POC) and competitiveness in innovation carriers, 
then and now
Sources of competitive POC based on innovation POC based on innovation Brazilian Brazilian
advantages Main competitive drivers, Main competitive drivers, competitiveness, competitiveness, 
1990 2002 1990 2002
Internal factors
Management Integration of R&D, No change Low capabilities Low capabilities, but 
production and marketing increasing marketing 
efforts
Production Design for manufacturing No change Some capabilities in Reliance on imported 
mechanical engineering design
Sales Market creation and Increased, due to t Low capabilities Increased
business-to- business he useof information 
marketing technologies
Innovation R&D + design Increased capabilities, Low capabilities Increasing reliance
due to the use of on imported technology
information technologies
Structural factors
Segmentation by technical No Change Capabilities in lower-end Increased segmentation
needs segments
Market Attention to client Increased Excessive standardization Increased responsive    ness
specifications
Local and regional trade Increased Exports of standard and Increased imports of 
technologically simple components from OECD
equipment and exports of final 
goods to Latin America
Economies of specialization Relative diversification Excessive diversification No clear pattern 
and verticalization discernible
Configuration Interaction with users Increased Low interaction Increasing interaction
of industry
Science and technology Increased Incipient Low technological 
systems investment  
Intellectual property rights Increased Nationalistic regulations Enforcement of property 
rights 
Regulatory and Selective protection Decreased Nationalistic regulations Excessive liberalization
incentive regime
Risk support No change Non-existent Limited
Credit for users No change Limited Limited
State purchasing power Decreased Few attempts Not in place
Source: Porto (2002).
2. Competitiveness in 2002: modernization,
import dependence and ownership 
internationalization
a) Growth, modernization, de-verticalization
and product upgrading
Suppliers of telecommunications equipment con-
siderably expanded their production capacity due to
the rigid expansion targets imposed upon telecommu-
nication utilities during the privatization process.
Computer assembly became internationalized through
foreign direct investment in new facilities and asset
acquisition and substantial increases in imports of
components, as a result of changes in legislation which
equalized opportunities for local and foreign-owned
firms, In the face of growing imports, producers of
mechanical engineering-based goods promoted a
rationalization process resulting in a significant
decrease in production capacity. 
Corporate efforts were focused on the introduc-
tion of new organizational techniques to ensure greater
efficiency of production processes, and reduction and
specialization of product portfolio. Through the adop-
tion of just-in-time methods and subcontracting, the
mechanical engineering sector was able to improve
efficiency and maintain minimum levels of produc-
tion, with a negative impact on employment levels
(which dropped from 331,900 in 1990 to 160,200 in
1999). In line with this trend, computer firms first of
all outsourced administrative activities and subse-
quently introduced new organizational techniques that
required fewer staff, resulting in sharp reductions in
employment levels. Thus, after employment had
expanded from 42,924 in 1984 to 74,155 in 1989, by
1999 the total number of employees in the computer
industry was down to 38,450 (Porto, 2002).
Low investment levels and trade liberalization
significantly affected the producers of mechanical
engineering equipment. While apparent consumption
decreased from US$ 17.2 billion in 1990 to US$ 14.4
billion in 2000, imports increased and local production
decreased substantially. During the decade, while pro-
duction levels declined steadily, exports and imports
evolved cyclically, with an upward trend until 1997
and declines thereafter (table 17). 
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TABLE  17
Brazil: production and international trade in mechanical equipment, 1990-2000
(US$ billion)
Year Production Exports Imports Trade Apparent Export Import
balance consumption coefficient % coefficient %
1990 16.7 2.6 3.2 -0.5 17.2 15.9 18.5
1995 14.3 3.8 6.9 -3.1 17.4 26.6 39.8
2000 11.5 3.5 6.4 -2.9 14.4 30.5 44.7
Source: Vermulm and Erber (2002).
The scenario for suppliers of telecommunications
equipment was very different from that of the mechan-
ical engineering sector. In the second half of the
1990s, this industry faced expanding demand due to
the rules on the privatization of telecommunications
utilities, coupled with intensive technical progress. An
estimate by Oliva (2002) suggests that under the
investment-inductive rules of concessions, sales
amounted to US$ 20 billion between 1998 and 2000.
Data from Oliva (2002) also show that sales rev-
enue in 2000 was 124% higher than the 1995 level.
These figures alone indicate that the growth in demand
attracted firms to install new assembly units in the
country. Brazilian firms were very efficient in setting
up local facilities, relying strongly on global sourcing
to ensure delivery times to clients. This is the reason
why the industry’s trade deficit reached US$ 2 billion
in 2001: the result of U$ 3.5 billion of imports (43%
from the United States, 26% from the European
Union) and US$ 1.5 billion of exports (90% to Latin
America). 
With regard to the computer industry (computers
and components), Porto (2002) found a big expansion
in sales, from US$ 6 billion in 1990 to US$ 10.7 bil-
lion in 1998. Since then growth has slowed down.
These figures suggest that the computer industry has
managed to outgrow component production. To a large
extent, this is explained by the increasing reliance of
this industry on imported components.
Indeed, when contrasting imports of components
and imports of final computer goods (table 18), the
disparity is quite clear: from 1997 to 2001 the average
annual value of components imports equalled US$ 5.1
billion, while that of imported computers amounted to
US$ 1.02 billion. More important, when local comput-
er sales decreased —after 2000— and the Real was
devalued —after 1999—, computer imports remained
relatively stable but imports of electronic components
increased even more.
TABLE  18
Brazil: Computer industry imports and exports, 1997-2001
(US$ million)
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Exports (1+2) 1 331 1 458 1 587 1 865 1 809
1. Computers 255 235 323 346 251
2. Components 1 076 1 223 1 264 1 519 1 558
of which, components 91 124 151 144 146
for computers
Imports (3+4) 6 406 5 840 5 874 7 690 6 793
3. Computers 1 232 1 090 855 1 080 1 032
4. Components 5 174 4 750 4 839 6 610 5 761
of which, components 562 671 665 856 782
for computers
Trade balance 5 075 4 382 4 287 5 825 4 984
Source: Porto (2002).
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b) The division of labour between local and 
foreign-owned firms
The competitiveness of Brazilian mechanical
engineering capital goods is higher in product lines of
low and medium technological intensity, where prod-
uct cycles have matured.
Price competitiveness is decisive, and company
advantages lie in privileged access to low-cost inputs
and labour. Brazilian industry is also competitive in
specific market niches, especially where the equip-
ment is technically more sophisticated, requiring
strong interactions between suppliers and clients, and
local and regional demand is relatively high in eco-
nomic terms.
However, some of the structural features of the
1980s, especially the division of labour between local
and foreign producers, have not changed. Locally
owned companies are prevalent in low-technology seg-
ments, while foreign companies dominate sophisticat-
ed product lines. The companies that have managed to
survive the hardships of the 1990s have improved their
competitiveness: they are leaner in terms of production
processes and product portfolios. Specialization levels
have increased, and this may constitute the basis upon
which to grow in the years to come. Even so, most of
the competitive challenges of the early 1990s remain,
especially those related to the continuing weakness of
the technological capability base.
In telecommunications, despite the increasing
reliance on imports, to a great extent demand could be
supplied from local sources because of the industry’s
previous experience within Brazil. Most of the inter-
national players were already established in the coun-
try before economic liberalization, and some local
firms were also very active, but the expansion of
demand brought in new foreign firms, through the
acquisition of local firms. As a result, in 2000 foreign
companies controlled 91.3% of the US$ 8.8 billion
total sales of the sector in that year (Oliva, 2002).
Indeed, according to Porto (2002), when a broad-
er definition is given to the computer and telecommu-
nications industries, the picture does not change very
much. The gross sales of the information technology
industries increased from US$ 16 billion to US$ 30
billion between 1996 and 2000, with foreign-owned
firms expanding their market share from 48.2% to
65.8%, at the expense of locally-owned private firms.
VIII
After ten years of economic liberalization, 
rationalization and inward internationalization 
in Brazil: What comes next?
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The institutional transition towards a new “market-
driven” paradigm was not a smooth process and uncer-
tainty increased, especially unpredictability in terms
of the extent of entry of new competitors and import-
ed goods. Firms lost the capacity to forecast the real
size of their markets and reacted by undertaking
defensive actions, most of them associated with cost
reduction, production rationalization and product
renewal, which led to further reductions of the already
low levels of microeconomic confidence. These low
levels of confidence were accompanied by a negative
propensity to invest, with similarly negative repercus-
sions on macroeconomic sustainability and economic
growth.
A balance of the “Made in Brazil” production
structure, ten years after economic liberalization, dis-
plays a strikingly different feature from those of other
Latin American countries: between 1990 and 2002
very few genuinely new economic activities were
added to the country’s industrial matrix, and very few
previously existing activities ceased to exist.
Most important changes were observed in the
management of production processes and in the own-
ership landscape of industry. Modernization and
inward internationalization were the most outstanding,
economically significant and generalized processes
taking place in Brazilian industry in the 1990-2002
period. These processes do not really represent inno-
vation in the Schumpeterian sense. Foreign capital has
always had a prominent role in industry, because the
Brazilian economy was never closed to foreign own-
ership as it was in foreign trade. As for modernization,
around the mid-1980s leading firms in most industrial
sectors were already introducing updated organiza-
tional techniques to increase efficiency and quality
(Ferraz, Kupfer and Haguenauer, 1996a). 
Over the years, modernization and inward inter-
nationalization were strengthened among leading
firms and extensively diffused across sectors, assum-
ing economically significant proportions. The role of
foreign capital was considerably strengthened, espe-
cially in dynamic industrial segments. Modernization
provided the basis upon which firms withstood com-
petitive pressures from expanding imports and the
entry of new competitors. The wide diffusion of
labour-saving techniques and machinery, de-vertical-
ization and subcontracting and the lack of sustained
growth in demand levels caused a decline in 
employment never seen before in Brazilian history. 
Modernization was strongly biased towards
rationalization rather than towards expanding produc-
tion capacity and developing innovation capabilities to
support the introduction of new processes and prod-
ucts. Facing changing macroeconomic conditions,
industrialists were not willing to invest in new plants
and even less in R&D, the most uncertain of all 
investments.
More interestingly, modernization did not induce
changes in the relative position of firms. Those that
were relatively stronger in the pre-change period have
shown better adaptive capacity and vice-versa. Large
firms and those which were foreign-owned, operating
in the industrial commodities or durables sectors and
located in the southern part of the country, have
widened the relative gap separating them from firms
lower down on the competitive ladder.
Foreign trade expanded significantly, from US$
50 billion in 1990 to US$ 100 billion in 2001. But
trade patterns remained relatively unchanged: import-
ed goods had high income elasticity of demand, while
low unit values prevailed in exports. Production mod-
ernization benefited from imported electronic compo-
nents and chemical inputs, while the industrial com-
modities group still generates most of the country’s
foreign exchange. Trade deficits soared and were over-
come only in 2000, after a heavy currency devalua-
tion. Regardless of these advances, the share of
Brazilian foreign trade in world trade has declined
from 1.4% in the mid-1980s to 0.75% in 2001.
Mergers and acquisitions changed the ownership
landscape of Brazilian industry, strongly reinforcing
the share of foreign capital. Moreover, between 1990
and 2002, investments in new plants and capacity
expansion were carried out only in a very few sectors:
steel, automotive products, consumer electronics and
telecommunications equipment. These are examples
of positive reactions to the expansion in demand and
pro-active responses to increasing competition, and
they are interesting in indicating a pro-growth vitality
in Brazilian industry.
Among industrial groups, some interesting regu-
larities exist. Strong competitiveness has been and
remains essentially associated with commodity pro-
ducers, where local capital is still prevalent. But com-
modity producers have followed a dual-track strategy:
exports of low unit value products and internal sales of
high unit value goods. In the durables sectors, com-
petitiveness was strengthened — especially in middle-
range products — through investments in new plants,
increasing product differentiation and expanding
imports of components. Foreign firms are dominant
and exports are increasing. Heterogeneity is still an
important feature of traditional industries, in which
local capital mostly predominates. Responsiveness —
a key competitive driver — has increased, along with
the formation of local production clusters and the relo-
cation of plants to low-cost regions, especially the
Northeast. Among innovation carriers, weaknesses
still prevail, although the firms significantly improved
their ability to deliver equipment when demand was
expanding. Ownership internationalization has
increased, inducing a marked division of labour: for-
eign firms control the assembly of equipment and the
importation of strategic components, while locally
owned firms are either suppliers of standardized com-
ponents or producers of technologically simple
machinery.
In short, Brazilian industry has shown consider-
able capacity to adapt to institutional change.
Competitive capabilities were reinforced, thanks to a
modernization drive strongly biased towards rational-
ization. Interestingly, however, in a few areas where
growth prospects were high, industry responded by
expanding capacity. Nevertheless, responsiveness to
the challenges imposed by economic liberalization and
growth prospects is unevenly distributed, favouring
those firms with previously accumulated capabilities.
Most probably this was an important factor in the
acceleration of ownership internationalization.
Consequently, Brazil may face a development
paradox in the years to come. History tells us that local
capital and innovation capabilities have been out-
standing features in countries which have been suc-
cessful in sustaining economic development. If owner-
ship internationalization is to remain and local innova-
tion capabilities are to be promoted, then Brazilian pri-
vate and public policy makers must seek new ways of
attracting the necessary investments. To a great extent,
this will mean an important departure from established
policy practices, towards new ways of regulating and
inducing firms to increase local value creation.
(Original: English)
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